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NOTES
APPLYING A PUBLIC BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT TO TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
Bob Jones University v. United States1
On its face, section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code2 is simply a
tax exemption, freeing certain organizations from the burdens of paying fed-
eral income tax. The result of this exemption, however, is equivalent to direct
payments by the government to these institutions.3 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) thus is in a position to regulate private conduct by determining
which groups are exempt.
In Bob Jones University v. United States,4 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the denial of tax exempt status to religious schools that practice
racial discrimination.5 Although the decision will significantly affect religious
schools, its potential impact is much broader, affecting every tax-exempt or-
ganization. By holding that section 501(c)(3) provides exemptions only to or-
ganizations that meet the common law definition of "charity," the Court effec-
tively determined that several hundred thousand organizations6 must
1. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), aff'g, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d
147 (4th Cir. 1980) and Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1981).
2. (1976). See generally Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Or-
ganizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
3. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (1983). But
see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (exemp-
tions and subsidies are "qualitatively different"); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at
357-58 (exemptions only reflect "the application of established principles of income
taxation to organizations . . . which do not seek profit"). A large and diverse group of
organizations are exempt under § 501(c)(3). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 472, 1975-2 C.B. 208
(halfway house); Rev. Rul. 533, 1970-2 C.B. 112 (day-care center); Rev. Rul. 372,
1968-2 C.B. 205 (sports museum). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS (1983) (groups eligible to
receive donations deductible under I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982)).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). The Court upheld the denial of tax-exempt status
to two separate schools, Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools.
5. Id. at 2029.
6. Benenson, Tax Exemption Controversy, 1982 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP.
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"demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest" to retain
their exempt status.
7
The application of common law principles to section 501(c)(3) implies
that the IRS may enforce important national policies by denying tax exemp-
tions to nonconforming organizations. These policies include the elimination of
racial discrimination in education, and the Court used language in Bob Jones
that makes other forms of discrimination possible targets of IRS action. The
first amendment and sincerely held religious beliefs notwithstanding, the Court
also decided that religious organizations also must comply with important pub-
lic policies to retain their exemptions.
Since 1965, the IRS has struggled to determine whether tax-exempt sta-
tus should be denied to private, racially discriminatory schools.8 Following a
1970 preliminary injunction barring it from granting exemptions to such
schools in Mississippi,9 the IRS reversed its policy and announced that it
would deny tax benefits to racially discriminatory schools.10 The case challeng-
ing the Mississippi exemptions was decided on the merits in 1971. The result-
ing opinion approved of the new IRS policy and permanently enjoined the
granting of exemptions to any school in Mississippi that practices racial dis-
crimination in the admissions process."
Later, Revenue Ruling 71-447 established that "[a] private school that
does not have a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students does not qual-
ify for exemption." 1 2 Revenue Ruling 75-231 specifically applied 71-447 to
church-operated schools.1 3 Proposed IRS procedures designed to enforce these
rulings and the progress of cases through the federal appellate courts gener-
ated a great deal of controversy. 4 In response, Congress postponed implemen-
211, 227.
7. 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
8. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 548, 552 (1971). The IRS suspended the grant-
ing of such exemptions for new applicants in 1965 and lifted the suspension in 1967.
Id.
9. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
10. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in Bob Jones, Petition for
Certiorari, Joint App. at A235. The IRS not only stated that it would revoke tax ex-
empt status, but also announced that gifts to such schools would not be deductible by
the donor. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 170 (1982) (charitable contribution deduction).
11. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), a.ff'd per curiam sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
12. Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Suits were filed in 1976 to seek stricter
IRS compliance with the Green injunction and Revenue Ruling 71-447. Note, The
Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93
HARV. L. REV. 378, 381-82 (1979). An injunction ordering stricter IRS enforcement
followed. Green v. Miller, 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 8-1566 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980); Lay-
cock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 259, 265 (1982).
13. Rev. Rul. 231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
14. See Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Sub-
[Vol. 49
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tation of the proposed procedures in September, 1979.11 Two years later, the
IRS changed its policy again, claiming that it lacked authority to deny exemp-
tions to religious schools.1"
One of the institutions in Bob Jones, Goldsboro Christian Schools, was
incorporated in 1963 as a church-affiliated school and has always had an ad-
missions policy that excludes blacks. 17 After an IRS determination that Golds-
boro did not meet the requirements of Revenue Rulings 71-447 and 75-231,
the school paid a portion of its overdue taxes and filed for a refund.18 The IRS
counterclaimed for the remaining overdue taxes. In Goldsboro Christian
Schools v. United States,'9 the District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that racial discrimination in private schools violated an
important federal policy.20 Determining that neither the free exercise nor the
establishment clause 21 prohibits denial of section 501(c)(3) status to Golds-
boro,22 the court held that federal tax benefits must be denied.23
Bob Jones University (University), has operated with the goal of "unqual-
comm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means on Proposed IRS Revenue
Procedure Affecting Tax Exemption of Private Schools, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Benenson, supra note 6, at 215-16; Laycock, supra
note 12, at 259-60; Note, supra note 12, at 382-84.
15. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 577 (1979); see also Note,
Bob Jones University v. United States, Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit,
1981, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 715-16 (1982).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2025. The "IRS position" or similar words refer here to the
IRS position at the trial court level that the exemptions should be denied. The changes
in the IRS position reflected the views of the Reagan Administration. Laycock, supra
note 12, at 259-60.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2024. Goldsboro Christian Schools based its policy on its in-
terpretation of the Bible. This interpretation holds that Caucasians, Hebrews, and
Blacks (along with Orientals) each descended from a different son of Noah. Although
cultural or biological mixing of the races is considered to be a violation of God's will,
the school apparently would not bar the admission of any racial group other than
blacks. Petition for Certiorari at 40-44, 83, Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United
States, No. 81-1 (U.S. 1983).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2024. Denial of exempt status under § 501(c)(3) results in the
loss of federal income tax exemption, exempt status under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B)
(1982) (Federal Insurance Contribution Act) (FICA), and exempt status under id. §
3306(c)(8) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act) (FUTA). Thus, Goldsboro was required
to pay overdue employee withholding, FICA, and FUTA taxes. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct.
at 2024. If an organization loses exempt status under § 501(c)(3), contributions to it
are not deductible under I.R.C. § 170 (1982). See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725, 728-30 (1974); note 10 supra.
19. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), affid per curiam, 644 F.2d 879
(1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
20. 436 F. Supp. at 1318.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
22. 436 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
23. Id. at 1318.
1984]
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ifiedly affirming and teaching the inspiration of the Bible. '24 About 5,000 stu-
dents are enrolled in courses ranging from kindergarten through graduate
school.25 The University has used the courts in a determined, but unsuccessful
attempt to retain federal tax and other benefits. In 1970, the IRS notified the
University that it would challenge the University's tax-exempt status.26 In Bob
Jones University v. Simon,27 the University's attempt to enjoin the IRS from
revoking its tax-exempt status was denied by the Supreme Court without
reaching the merits.2 8 The Court held that no injunction could issue until a
determination of tax liability was made.29 This decision permitted the Univer-
sity to judicially challenge its loss of exempt status only after receiving an
unfavorable IRS ruling.30
In an apparent attempt to retain exempt status while minimizing the
harm to its beliefs and policies, 31 the University began to liberalize its admis-
sions practices. In 1971, married blacks became eligible for admission.32 Two
years later, unmarried black employees of the University with four years of
service became eligible.33 Finally, in 1975, the University opened its doors
completely to students of all races, but it retained its stringent policy against
24. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D.S.C. 1980)
(quoting University Certificate of Incorporation), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
25. 469 F. Supp. at 894.
26. Id. at 892-93.
27. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
28. Id. at 749.
29. Id. The holding was based on the Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a)
(1982), which prohibits suits to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes before the
IRS determines that liability exists. But cf. id. § 7428(a)(1)(A) (1982) (1976 Tax
Reform Act amendment allowing declaratory judgments of § 501(c)(3) and §
170(c)(2) status). As a general rule, once administrative appeal procedures are ex-
hausted, the taxpayer can challenge a tax assessment by: (1) filing suit in the Tax
Court without paying the tax, I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982); (2) paying the tax and filing
suit in federal district court, id. § 7422(a) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982); or
(3) paying the tax and filing suit in the Court of Claims, I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1982); 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982). See A. KRAGEN & J. McNuLTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION 7 (2d ed. 1974). In a suit seeking a declaratory judgment under the 1976 Tax
Reform Act, the same courts have jurisdiction, but the disputed taxes need not be paid.
I.R.C. § 7428 (1982).
30. See text accompanying note 125 infra (criticism of current procedures for
reviewing IRS rulings). The University suffered another judicial defeat when the
Fourth Circuit upheld the Veteran's Administration position that the University's ad-
missions policy precluded it from operating as a VA-approved institution. Bob Jones
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 600-01, 608 (D.S.C. 1974) (applying the due
process clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976)), affd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
31. See Note, Favorable Tax Treatment is Accorded a University Displaying
Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination, 2 WHITTIER L. REv. 713, 728 (1980).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2022-23. Married blacks presented less risk of interracial dat-
ing or marriage. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 894.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 2022 n.5.
[Vol. 49
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interracial dating and marriage.34
After the IRS determined that the University owed half a million dollars
in unemployment taxes, the University paid twenty-one dollars of the disputed
amount, and brought suit seeking a refund. The IRS filed a counterclaim for
the unpaid taxes.3 5 The South Carolina District Court held for the University,
distinguishing Goldsboro on the basis that the University no longer followed a
policy of discriminatory admissions.36 The court also stated that: (1) no
"clearly declared federal public policy against racial discrimination by reli-
gious organizations" exists;3 7 (2) the IRS anti-discrimination rules applicable
to educational organizations do not apply to a primarily religious organization
such as Bob Jones University;38 (3) the first amendment prohibits the denial of
tax benefits to otherwise eligible religious organizations that discriminate ra-
cially;30 and (4) the IRS exceeded its authority in adding to section 501(c)(3)
a requirement that an organization provide a public benefit and conform to
public policy.4
0
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, approving of the IRS
Revenue Rulings.4 1 The same circuit subsequently affirmed Goldsboro.4 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, combined the cases for argument,4 3 and af-
34. Id. at 2023. The final relaxation of the admissions rules was apparently
prompted by at least three events. In April, 1975, the IRS had notified the University
of the proposed revocation of its § 501(c)(3) status. Id. The previous year the Fourth
Circuit had upheld the denial of VA educational benefits to University students. See
note 30 supra. Perhaps most importantly, the Fourth Circuit had just determined that
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) created a cause of action in favor of victims of discriminatory
admissions policies of private schools. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th
Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see also 103 S. Ct. at 2023 (revised University
dating rules).
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2023. For nonprofit schools, the major tax benefits stemming
from § 501 (c)(3) are exemption from federal unemployment and social security taxes,
as well as an increase in contributions resulting from the tax deductions allowed to
donors. For federal tax purposes, gifts to the schools would not be taxable to the
schools as income, so loss of § 501(c)(3) status would not normally result in income tax
liability, see I.R.C. § 102 (1982) (excludes value of gifts received from gross income),
even if "income," broadly defined, exceeded expenses.
36. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 899.
37. Id. at 897.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 897-901.
40. Id. at 901-07.
41. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103
S. Ct. 2017 (1983). The Fourth Circuit found that the IRS had not exceeded its au-
thority or violated the first amendment in applying the regulation. 639 F.2d at 155.
42. 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir 1981) (per curiam).
43. See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2021; Laycock, supra note 12, at 261 & n.17.
The change in the administration's position not only raised a storm of protest, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1982, at A27, col. 1, it left the denial of tax exemptions cause without
an advocate. Consequently, the Supreme Court appointed an amicus curiae to defend
the fourth circuit decisions. Bob Jones, No. 81-1 (U.S. April 19, 1982); Laycock, supra
note 12, at 261 & n.18; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1982, § IV, at 18, col. 1 (Rea-
1984]
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firmed both, with Justice Powell concurring and Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
The Court found that exempt organizations not only must fall within one of
the categories of section 501(c)(3), but that they must also provide a public
benefit and conform to public policy. 44  The public benefit and public policy
requirements are derived from the common law of charities, which was shaped
largely by the common law and English statutes concerning the meaning of
charitable trusts.45 "Public benefit" and "public policy" are two distinct con-
cepts.4 6 An organization can confer a public benefit even if some of its activi-
ties are against public policy; conversely, an organization may violate no pub-
lic policy, yet offer no public benefit.47 Treating the policy requirement as a
corollary to the benefit requirement is the soundest approach. 4 8 Thus, an oth-
erwise eligible organization should be considered charitable if it confers a net
public benefit. Contravention of public policy is merely a factor in determining
if a net benefit exists. This combination of the two concepts was expressed in
the Supreme Court's determination that "[t]he institution's purpose must not
be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any
gan administration's retreats from IRS trial court position).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2026-29. The exempt categories are for religious, scientific,
literary, or educational organizations and organizations that provide testing for public
safety, aid amateur athletics, or prevent cruelty to children or animals. I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (1982). With the addition of the Bob Jones public benefit requirement, there
are four types of activities: (1) charitable activities; (2) activities that are not charita-
ble but not against public policy; (3) activities that violate an important public policy,
but are not sufficiently evil to offset the benefits of the charitable activities; and (4)
activities that are "so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine
any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred;" 103 S. Ct. at 2029. The second
type of activity will result in the loss of exempt status only if it is substantial. Better
Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945); Stevens Bros. Found. v.
Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964);
B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 11.2 (4th ed. 1983). The
fourth type of activity will result in a loss of exempt status whether substantial or not.
See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2036 (implies that any form of racial discrimination will
cause loss of exemption). The effect of the third category was not decided by the Court.
Id. at 2031 n.21.
45. See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2026-28; M. CHESTERMAN, CHARITIES, TRUSTS
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 6 (1979). See generally 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
377 (3d ed. 1967).
46. Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious
Schools, 36 TAX L. REV. 477, 483-85 (1981). Simon has distinguished three theories in
support of the IRS interpretation: public benefit, charitable trust, and public policy.
47. A school that provides unsafe playground equipment, for example, may be
contravening public policy while it confers a substantial educational benefit to the pub-
lic. Yet a religious organization, such as a convent isolated from public contact, pro-
vides no legally recognizable public benefit, while violating no public policy. See Gil-
mour v. Coats, 1949 A.C. 426 (gift to cloistered convent not deductible). The reasoning
in Gilmour was that the nuns provided no tangible religious or other services. Id. at
446, questioned in M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 45, at 160-63.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2028; see also Simon, supra note 46, at 485 (public benefit,
public policy, and charitable trust theories "are all parts of a coherent analysis ...
[which supports] the same interpretation of the statute").
[Vol. 49
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public benefit that might otherwise be conferred." '4 9
Citing legislative history, the Court found that Congress did not intend
for all organizations that are educational, religious, or within another
501(c)(3) category to be exempt, and that a public benefit requirement ex-
ists.5 The Court also referred to the parallel wording of I.R.C. section
170(c). 51 Section 170(c) defines charitable contributions and 501(c)(3) defines
exempt organizations by using almost identical wording. The Court found this
persuasive in reaching its conclusion that 501(c)(3) organizations must also be
charitable.
52
The addition of the public benefit requirement to tax-exempt charities is
not a novel idea. In Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel,53 the House of
Lords held that "charitable purposes" had the same meaning in the income
tax statutes as it had in the law of charitable trusts.54 Although section
501(c)(3) does not define "charitable purposes," the list of exempt organiza-
tions is analogous to the traditional list of charitable organizations.5 5 "Charita-
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2029. The public policy requirement can be applied to the
Code without regard to the law of charities. For example, granting deductions for fines
incurred by a company violating state highway laws would support activity contrary to
public policy and undermine state law enforcement. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 356 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1958). Despite the absence of any specific authority, the
IRS was held to have correctly disallowed the attempt to deduct the fines as business
expenses. The Bob Jones Court avoided relying on Tank Truck, referring to it only in
passing. 103 S. Ct. at 2028 n.17. Although Tank Truck was subsequently incorporated
into the Code, I.R.C. § 162(0 (1982), Congress has expressed an intent to limit the
doctrine to denying deductions under § 162 for fines, bribes, and antitrust treble dam-
age awards. Id. § 162(c), (f), (g); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. p74-75
(1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2028; see H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19
(1938); 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
51. (1982).
52. 103 S. Ct. at 2026. Section 170(c)(2) does not provide deductions for con-
tributions to organizations that provide testing for public safety, but is otherwise simi-
lar to § 501(c)(3).
53. 1891 A.C. 531.
54. Id. at 583; M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 45, at 59-60. But cf. Dingle v.
Turner, 1972 A.C. 601, 624 (no reason to apply charitable trust law concepts to tax
law definition of "charity"). The English experience with the income tax was influential
in shaping the 1894 income tax law. See 26 CONG. REc. 584-88 (1894) (information
inserted by Rep. Bryan); id. at 6612-15 (information inserted by Rep. Hill).
55. See International Reform Fed'n v. District Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 131 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 693 (1942). State govern-
ments have often used terms found in the law of charities in providing for tax exemp-
tions. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J.
525, 526 (1958); e.g., ARIZ. CONsT. art. IX, § 2 ("Property of educational, charitable
and religious associations. . . may be exempt from taxation by law."); W. VA. CONST.
art. X, § 1 ("[P]roperty used for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
purposes . . . may by law be exempted from taxation.") The West Virginia provision
was strictly construed to invalidate an exemption granted to commercial property held
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ble" is used as one category of 501(c)(3) organizations, and this would indi-
cate that the public benefit requirement should apply only to that category of
organizations.5 6 The deviation from the literal words of section 501(c)(3) is,
according to the Court, necessary to effect Congress's intent to apply the legal
definition, and not the narrower lay definition, of "charity."57
This departure from the literal language of the statute has subjected the
IRS to strong criticism. 8 Use of the disjunctive "or" in section 501(c) (3) ordi-
narily means that "charitable" would not limit or define the terms "religious"
or "educational.1 59 Even if there is sufficient ambiguity in this section to jus-
tify a review of the legislative history, it is difficult to find persuasive evidence
that Congress intended to impose a public benefit requirement.60
Concepts developed under charitable trust law should not be uncritically
applied'to tax statutes." In Walz v. Tax Commission,62 the Court found that
One important effect of the Bob Jones decision is the adoption, by the Supreme
Court, of the traditional definition of "charitable purposes." 103 S. Ct. at 2025-28.
56. See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26; see also Pfeiffer v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 3 (2d
Cir.) (Hand, J., dissenting) (criticism of overly strict application of the "plain mean-
ing" rule), affd sub nom. Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937); cf. Reiling, supra
note 55, at 527 (section 501 (c)(3) was intended to incorporate common law definition
of "charity").
58. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2040-43 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Revocation of the Tax Ex-
empt Status of a Private Religious College Does Not Violate the First Amendment, 50
U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 624-25 (1981); Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Treatment
of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organizations, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 930 (1979).
59. Reitner v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1978); see also St. Martin
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 791 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (resort to legislative history is appropriate only when statute is ambigu-
ous); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (same); cf. Kimberley School v.
Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28, 33-35, 65 A.2d 500, 502-03 (1949) (applying "plain
meaning" rule to property tax exemption statute and holding that a nonprofit school is
exempt whether or not it is charitable). Another basis for challenging the IRS interpre-
tation can be derived from § 501 (c)(3). The public benefit requirement consists of two
parts: the organization must provide a benefit, and the beneficiaries must constitute a
portion of the general public. M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 45, at 136. Since §
501(c)(3) includes the second limitation (in its prohibition on private benefit), and
omits the first, the addition of the public benefit requirement seems inappropriate. If
Congress intended for traditional charity law to be applied, the prohibition on private
benefit is superfluous.
60. Comment, Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and
Discrimination, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 849, 863 (1980); see Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at
2040-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, re-
printed in 1954 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4077.
61. See, e.g., Thomas v. Harrison, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 156, 191 N.E.2d 862,
872 (P. Ct. 1962) (IRS determination that organization is not charitable not binding
under state mortmain law); E. FISCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACHTER, CHARITIES AND
CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 3, at 3 (1974) ("[A] charity for purposes ...of tort
immunity or the rule against perpetuities may not be a charity for tax purposes.").
8
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providing state property tax exemptions to religious organizations did not vio-
late the establishment clause.6" The Court, however, specifically rejected the
theory that religious organizations could be granted exemptions on the basis of
their contributions to social welfare.64 This statement from Walz is inconsis-
tent with the theory that Congress could use a public benefit analysis to justify
tax exemptions to religious organizations.0 5
The national policy against racial discrimination in education is "unmis-
takably clear""6 and "compelling." ' In Bob Jones, the Court found that this
policy is so important that a violation of it would "undermine any public bene-
fit that might otherwise be conferred. '68 Segregated private schools distort the
viewpoint of their students, perpetuating the racism of the school's
supporters.69
Although private discrimination is a significant social problem, an even
greater conflict with public policy results from interference with public school
integration.7 0 As the federal courts began to enforce Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation 7 in the South, thousands of "segregation academies" opened to accom-
modate the "white flight" from the newly integrated schools.72 These schools
62. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
63. Id. at 680.
64. Id. at 674. The public benefit requirement was applied to religious organiza-
tions in England before the disestablishment of the Church of England. At that time,
the Church provided many of the welfare services subsequently provided by the state.
See Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Revocation of the Tax Exempt Status of a
Private Religious College Does Not Violate the First Amendment, 50 U. CIN. L. REV.
615, 626-27 (1981). Trusts to support religions other than the established Church were
treated as invalid as against public policy. M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 45, at 77. See
generally id. chs. 2-5.
65. See Note, supra note 64, at 626-27.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2032.
67. Id. at 2035.
68. Id. at 2029; see text accompanying note 49 supra.
69. See Drake, Tax Status of Private Segregated Schools: The New Revenue
Procedure, 20 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 463, 506-07 (1979).
70. The existence of discriminatory schools in Goldsboro, North Carolina evi-
dently did not prevent that city from experiencing one of the nation's most successful
school desegregations. Black and white achievement test scores rose after desegrega-
tion. R. MAYER, C. KING, A. BORDERS-PATTERSON & J. MCCULLOUGH, THE IMPACT
OF DESEGREGATION IN A SOUTHERN CITY 85, 105 (1974). Unfortunately, it seems that
few other school systems have experienced similar success. See Crain & Mahard, Seg-
regation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer, 1978, at 17, 18 n.2.
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973). These schools often
received significant state support to undermine federal desegregation orders. E.g., Grif-
fin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964) (tuition grants); Brown v. South
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199, 199 (D.S.C.) (scholarships), aff'd per
curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F.
Supp. 833, 835 (E.D. La. 1967) (tuition grants), afl'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571
(1968); see Annot., supra note 8, at 550.
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continue to provide a "haven to parents seeking to avoid public school
integration. '73
The majority opinion, the concurring opinion by Justice Powell, and the
dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist all concluded that denying tax benefits
did not violate the first amendment.7 4 The free exercise clause limits the gov-
ernment's power to interfere with religious practices.7 5 If the government can
demonstrate a compelling public interest, however, a neutrally applied restric-
tion on free exercise is permitted. 8 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 the Court stated
that to be valid under the establishment clause, a statute must: have a secular
purpose; not have a primary effect of inhibiting or advancing religion; and not
create excessive entanglement with religion.78 These decisions have created a
balancing test, weighing the first amendment values against the government
interest at stake.7 9
Denying section 501(c)(3) status only indirectly burdens the free exercise
of religious beliefs and practices. The IRS rulings do not prohibit any religion
from operating racially discriminatory schools.80 Bob Jones and Goldsboro can
continue to operate, can still voice their religious beliefs and, if they are will-
73. Case Comment, Racial Exclusion by Religious Schools: Brown v. Dade
Christian Schools, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 879, 886 (1978); Comment, Section 1981
after Runyon v. McCrary: The Free Exercise Right of Private Sectarian Schools to
Deny Admission to Blacks on Account of Race, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1252. Bob
Jones University was not a typical segregation academy because its discriminatory poli-
cies preceded Brown by several years. See Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 893-94.
74. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2044 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2036
(Powell, J., concurring).
75. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1053 (2d ed. 1983).
76. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (upholding Social Secur-
ity taxation of Amish employer because of overriding government interest in raising
revenue); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (state's interest in guar-
anteeing child welfare justifies forbidding sale of religious tracts by children).
77. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78. Id. at 612-13.
79. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (state can
provide free transportation to students of religious schools as well as public school stu-
dents because benefit to religious groups is indirect and promotes child safety) with
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1979) (state cannot provide free transporta-
tion to parochial students for field trips because benefit aids religious groups more di-
rectly and inures to school rather than students). While a state may not provide
unaudited funds to a parochial school to offset expenses incurred by state testing re-
quirements, Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
480-82 (1973), audited funding procedures are permissible because they insure that
secular purposes are furthered. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Re-
gan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-62 (1980).
80. See Simon, supra note 46, at 502-05. Congress can make distinctions in
exercising its taxing power, even though they impose indirect burdens on the free exer-
cise of religious beliefs. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-09 (1961) (state
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ing to forgo tax-exempt status, presumably they can retain their present
policies."'
The government interest in eliminating racial discrimination is compel-
ling.82 This interest is as important as those interests previously held sufficient
to justify burdening free exercise.8 3 The federal government has, for example,
the power to launch a vigorous attack on the practice of polygamy 4 or to
impose social security taxes on Amish employers;8 5 and state child-labor laws
may prohibit the selling of religious literature by children, 6 despite the burden
on religious beliefs.
The Court briefly disposed of a contention that providing tax benefits to
some, but not all, religious groups was forbidden by the establishment clause.
The Court found that section 501 (c)(3), as interpreted, had a secular purpose
and was neutral in effect. The government can enforce a neutral law with a
secular purpose even if a coincidental effect is to favor one religion over
another.
8 7
The most important establishment clause concern in Bob Jones is exces-
sive entanglement. Denying a tax exemption based upon an IRS determination
that a religious school discriminates racially does create government-church
entanglement.88 As the Court indicated, however, the entanglement problem
would exist even if sincere religious practices were excluded from the IRS
ruling. The IRS would then be required to examine the sincerity of a religious
belief that supports discrimination.8
81. Liability may exist under 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1976). See notes 135-37 and
accompanying text infra.
82. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2029-31, 2035; cf Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 468-69 (1973) (discrimination in private schools "exerts a pervasive influence on
the entire educational process"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (students
have a "fundamental" right to be free from racial discrimination).
83. Note, supra note 31, at 731; notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67
(1879); Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the First Amend-
ment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1980).
85. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
86. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-70 (1944).
87. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.30 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (Sunday closing laws upheld as only incidentally coinciding with
the tenets of some religions)); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (tax law that is entirely neutral in general application is not
constitutionally suspect).
88. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 264; Note, The Internal Revenue Service's
Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organiza-
tions, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 931 (1979); cf Walz, 397 U.S. at 698-99 (Harlan,
J., concurring) ("[T]he more discriminating and complicated the basis of classification
for an exemption--even a neutral one-the greater the potential for state involvement
in evaluating the character of organizations.").
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.30; cf. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 ("Either course, taxation
of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion."). The
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The Court concluded that legal and practical reasons justify granting ex-
tensive authority to the IRS to interpret the Code.90 The majority opinion first
concludes that the IRS position was correct, and only then does it discuss the
authority of the IRS.9' Instead of reaching its own conclusions and then exam-
ining the authority of the IRS,9 the Court could have upheld the rulings as
reasonable interpretations of the IRC. If the rulings were upheld in this man-
ner, it would be irrelevant that the Court, in the absence of an IRS interpreta-
tion, might have reached a different result.
Unless "weighty reasons" exist, courts will not overturn agency interpre-
tations. 3 Congress has given the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue broad authority to issue regulations and interpret
the Internal Revenue Code.94 Treasury regulations, consequently, will be up-
held unless "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue stat-
utes." 95 The courts have specifically recognized the necessity of allowing the
IRS to make policy decisions when literal application of the Code would have
an undesirable result.98
After recognizing that congressional inaction is normally of little use in
determining the validity of administrative action, the Court found that Con-
gress' failure to overturn the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) was evi-
dence of its acquiescence or approval. The Court pointed out that Congress
was "acutely aware" of the 1970 and 1971 IRS rulings due to their controver-
sial nature.97 In the dozen years since these rulings, despite "exhaustive hear-
ings" and the introduction of thirteen bills to overturn them, Congress has not
altered section 501(c)(3).9 8 In spite of many changes to the Code, including
district courts avoided an inquiry into the sincerity of the religious beliefs involved by
finding or assuming that the beliefs were sincere. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 894-96(court and IRS found sincerity); Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1317 (sincerity assumed
for purposes of partial summary judgment).
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2031-32.
91. Id. at 2030.
92. Id. at 2030-32.
93. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW § 4.6, at 160 (2d ed. 1984).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 301. (1982); I.R.C. §§ 7801(a), 7802(a), 7805(a) (1982); see
also Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (be-
cause Congress has determined that the Treasury Department, rather than the courts,
should administer the tax laws, Commissioner's regulations are given great deference).
95. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1947).
96. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35
(1958); see also note 49 supra.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 2033.
98. E.g., H.R. 1096, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 3225, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1975); see also Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax
Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools, Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity, Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity,
91st Cong., 2d Sess (1970).
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the addition of section 501(i), 99 Congress has not only left section 501(c)(3)
intact, it has recognized that racial discrimination in education is inconsistent
with tax exempt status.'0 °
As Justice Rehnquist indicated, the "implicit ratification" argument has
some weaknesses.' 0 ' The failure of one Congress to change an interpretation of
a statute enacted by a prior Congress, perhaps of a different era and with
another party in the majority, is of almost no value in construing the
statute.'L2
Even assuming that congressional inaction implicitly ratifies administra-
tive rulings, it is difficult to find a ratification in the case of section 501(c)(3).
The IRS adopted one interpretation of the exemption and deduction sections
sixty years ago, changed its interpretation in the early seventies, and changed
or attempted to change its interpretation while the present controversy was
pending before the Supreme Court.'013 If Congress "ratified" the post-1970
IRS construction of section 501(c)(3), it can be argued with even greater
force, as Justice Rehnquist indicated, that Congress "ratified" the long-stand-
ing pre-1970 interpretation.' At best, Justice Rehnquist contended, little can
be discerned from Congress' actions (or inaction) and words, either before or
after 1970.105
Neither Goldsboro nor Bob Jones profess any hatred toward blacks.
Goldsboro opposes both "cultural" and "biological" mixing of the races and
completely excludes blacks. 10 In contrast, Bob Jones claims that it does not
have any religious convictions against admitting blacks,'10 7 and, in 1975, it offi-
99. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-568, pt. (a), 90 Stat. 2697, 2697
(current version at I.R.C. § 501(i) (1982)).
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2032-34 (citing S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 6051, 6058).
101. Id. at 2043-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962); R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 179-83 (1975).
103. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
104. See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2043 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dye & Web-
ster, Sup. Ct. in Bob Jones holds that exempt organizations are bound by law of char-
ity, 59 J. TAX'N 70, 72 (1983); cf. Brief for the United States at 24, Bob Jones, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983) ("An administrative reversal of position so many years later provides
no legal basis for ascribing to a much earlier Congress an intent patently at odds with
the very words of the statute.").
105. 103 S. Ct. at 2043 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 60, at
863 ("little evidence of a systematic legislative policy behind . . . list of exempt
organizations")
106. Petition for Certiorari, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Joint App. at 41. Al-
legedly, no blacks ever applied to Goldsboro. Brief for Petitioner, Goldsboro Christian
Schools at 43.
107. BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, THE BOMB AND ITS FALLOUT 4 (1983). Appar-
ently, until "agitation" made the idea impractical, Bob Jones University considered
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cially abandoned its racially discriminatory admissions policy.10 8 The Univer-
sity does prohibit interracial dating and marriage by its students.109 Citing
prior Supreme Court decisions that support its conclusion that such limits on
interracial association are forms of race discrimination, the majority refused to
distinguish the policies of Bob Jones from those of Goldsboro." 0 The Court
used a single paragraph to dispose of Bob Jones' claim that it is
nondiscriminatory."'
What the Court chose not to do is as significant as what it did. It could
have vacated the cases as moot and dismissed the appeal once the IRS decided
that it would not defend its position before the Court. Another option was
issuing a narrowly written opinion approving of the IRS interpretation without
imposing a general public benefit requirement on all section 501(c)(3)
organizations."'
The public benefit requirement may create problems for all section
501(c)(3) organizations. The test may be expanded to punish discrimination
other than that based on race. In addition, the vagueness of the public benefit
and public policy concepts can create uncertainty for charitable organizations.
The possibility that the public benefit requirement could be applied to punish
sex discrimination was raised by the original brief for the United States (com-
posed before the administration chose not to defend the IRS rulings). The
brief implied that sex discrimination was roughly comparable to racial dis-
crimination, but it stated that the Commissioner had no intention of denying
exempt status to punish sex discrimination.2 3
108. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
109. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 894-95.
110. 103 S. Ct. at 2036. Neither the concurring opinion by Justice Powell, nor
the dissent by Justice Rehnquist distinguished between the two institutions' policies.
111. Id. But cf. Note, supra note 15, at 712 (criticism of the Fourth Circuit's
support in finding that Bob Jones violated an important public policy).
112. Other options were available. E.g., Allen, The Tax-Exempt Status of Seg-
regated Schools, 24 TAX L. REV. 409, 424-31 (1969) (racially discriminatory schools
serve a noneducational purpose and therefore are not operated exclusively for an ex-
empt purpose); id. at 426 (schools serve no public purpose); id. at 429-31 (exemptions
are forbidden "assistance" to discriminatory organizations within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
113. (Draft) Brief for the United States at 37. The original brief also noted that
the "constitutional and federal statutory proscriptions are far less pervasive" with re-
gard to sex discrimination. Id. This disclaimer can hardly be reassuring to § 501(c)(3)
organizations, since this IRS position may change, just as its stand on racially discrimi-
natory schools changed. See Brief of Petitioner, Goldsboro Christian Schools at 36
(pressure on IRS to deny exemptions to schools practicing sex discrimination); Brief of
the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA) as Amicus Cu-
riae at 3 (courts could apply public policy analysis to punish treatment of women by
many Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and other religious groups); Dye & Webster, supra
note 104, at 74 (single-sex colleges, churches without female clergy, and religious orga-
nizations that confer benefits only on coreligionists "are all now subject to question").
But cf. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 126
(2d ed. 1983) (no court has held that sex discrimination is inconsistent with the §
[Vol. 49
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The vagueness of the public benefit concept could have a chilling effect on
the activities of exempt organizations and result in random and inconsistent
enforcement. 1 4 There is little vagueness in the IRS position as applied. Proba-
bly any form of racial discrimination will result in the loss of tax benefits. By
failing to carefully limit the future application of the public benefit require-
ment to prohibit racial discrimination, however, the Court has left the lower
courts and the IRS to develop new, unpredictable limitations on charities.
Past attempts to apply public policy or public benefit requirements to non-
profit organizations have had undesirable results. In some states, statutes have
required that local courts approve the applications of nonprofit groups seeking
to incorporate."15 Some local judges required that the organizations conform to
public policy or corporate status was denied. 16 As might be expected, unpopu-
lar organizations were denied corporate status,"17 judges used their personal
views in reviewing applications," 8 and inconsistent approvals and denials of
corporate status resulted."19 There is a danger that the IRS policy could vary
with each change in the political climate. 20 The attempt by the IRS to aban-
501(c)(3) status of social clubs). The public benefit requirement might also be ex-
panded to deny § 501(c)(3) status to discrimination based on sexual preference. Nixon,
Pity the Heathen Court, LIBERTY, July-Aug. 1983, at 19, 21; cf. B. HOPKINS, supra
note 44, § 6.9, at 135-36 (organizations that discriminate on basis of marital status,
national origin, handicap, or age will risk losing exempt status).
114. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) ("public policy" so
vague that it "should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination if at all, only
with the utmost circumspection"); Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d
1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (vague laws do not provide notice to public or guidelines
for officials); Comment, supra note 60, at 877-79 (chilling effect and abuse of
discretion).
115. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 352.060 (1978). In Missouri, an alternate
means of incorporation exists, permitting direct application to the Secretary of State.
Id. §§ 355.050-.055.
116. See Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d
376, 382, 174 N.E.2d 487, 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388, 391 (1961); McAulay & Brewster,
In re Application of the Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, 6
How. L.J. 169, 170 (1960); Note, Judicial Approval as a Prerequisite to Incorpora-
tion of Non-Profit Organizations in New York and Pennsylvania, 55 COLUM. L. REv.
380, 388-89 (1955).
117. McAulay & Brewster, supra note 116, at 171 (criticizes denial of nonprofit
corporate status to a white group advocating racial segregation). The New York Court
of Appeals subsequently held that the lower courts had no statutory power to apply the
public policy test. Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9
N.Y.2d at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391; see also Comment, supra
note 60, at 877.
118. Note, supra note 116, at 388-89.
119. Id. at 389.
120. The federal tax authorities have also occasionally sought to apply a public
policy analysis to various organizations. Fifty years ago, a deduction for a contribution
to an anti-vivisection society was determined not to be a charitable gift. The conten-
tion, overturned by the courts, was that the societies were not charitable because they
opposed a governmentally-approved practice. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives &
Granting of Annuities v. Helvering, 66 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
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don its position that Bob Jones and Goldsboro were ineligible for exemptions is
an example of such a change.'21
Some question exists as to the ability of the IRS to adequately enforce its
rulings. Some private schools have retained their tax exemptions even after
federal courts (in cases not involving exempt status) have found them to be
discriminatory. 12 2 Justice Powell feared that the majority would give too much
power to the IRS in an area beyond the agency's expertise. 123 IRS agents are
presumably specialists in tax law and generally lack the expertise to handle
complex non-tax matters." 4 Furthermore, the procedures for judicially chal-
lenging unfavorable IRS actions are of little value due to the time and formal-
ity involved."15
There are, however, defenders of the IRS ability to determine exempt
status. The IRS already makes important decisions relating to nontax mat-
ters, 22 and it has created a separate division to audit exempt organizations. 127
The IRS regularly holds hearings on matters of public concern, 128 and, since
1976, organizations have been able to seek a judicial determination of their
exempt status once an unfavorable IRS ruling is made, without first being
required to incur tax liability."29 A plan to shift the determination of exempt
status to another agency was considered in 1969. The plan was rejected, par-
tially because of the high regard Congress has for IRS enforcement
121. See Benenson, supra note 6, at 211. The IRS initially was hostile to claims
by public interest law firms that they deserved § 501(c)(3) status. This position may
have been due to the controversial nature of such firms and the outcries of private
interests threatened by the firms' activities. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note
113, at 113.
122. Hearings, supra note 14, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue); Letter from Arthur Flemming to Rep. Chisholm (May 16, 1978),
reprinted in id. at 237.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring).
124. See Note, The IRS, Discrimination, and Religious Schools: Does the Re-
vised Revenue Procedure Exact Too High a Price?, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 141, 151-
52 (1980).
125. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 113, at 287.
126. Drake, supra note 69, at 507. Revenue provisions and their interpretation
have an impact, for example, on the decision to marry, compare I.R.C. § l(a) (1982)
with id. § 1(c) (marriage penalty); or buy a house, see id. § 163 (interest on mortgages
deductible). The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs evidently makes decisions
as to whether religious organizations require the use of an otherwise illegal drug to
practice their religion. See 21 C.F.R. §.1307.31 (1983); Comment, Brave New World
Revisited: Fifteen Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 879, 900-01. If
the Bureau is capable of making such a difficult determination involving first amend-
ment issues and so unrelated to its basic function, the IRS should be similarly capable.
127. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 113, at 53.
128. See, e.g., 1983-26 I.R.B. 1 (announcement of hearings on proposed regula-
tions relating to personal service corporations); 1983-12 I.R.B. 1 (hearings relating to
credit for increasing research activities).
129. I.R.C. § 7428 (1982); P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 113, at
284. But see text accompanying note 125 supra.
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Even if narrowly construed, Bob Jones will still have a significant impact
upon discriminatory religious schools. Many of these schools will become sub-
ject to social security and federal unemployment compensation taxes. 131 The
loss of deductible-donee status under section 170(c) will greatly reduce their
fund-raising capabilities. 32
The loss of section 501(c)(3) status will have other, incidental, effects.
Exempt organizations are often exempt from state taxes, eligible to receive
reduced postage rates, and benefit from other provisions of state or federal
law.133 The total economic burden will be significant, and the schools will also
be stigmatized by the loss of section 501(c)(3) status." 4
The Bob Jones decision has important implications for civil rights law. In
Runyon v. McCrary,"35 the Court expressly declined to decide whether reli-
gious schools would be subject to a section 1981 action. 36 The rejection of the
first amendment defenses in Bob Jones implies that such defenses will not pre-
vail in a 1981 suit.' 37
Troubled by the majority's broad language, Justice Powell based his con-
curring opinion on the theory of implicit ratification by Congress.' 38 While
130. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 113, at 277-78.
131. See note 18 supra. Up to 3,000 schools may be affected. Drake, supra note
69, at 505.
132. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 729-30; Dye & Webster, supra note
104, at 73.
133. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 113, at 15. Financial benefits
may be lost at the federal, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (1976) (reduced postage rates); 40
U.S.C. § 484(k)(1) (1976) (eligibility to receive surplus federal property), and state
levels, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 143.441 (1978) (income tax exemption for organizations
qualifying under § 501(c)(3)).
134. Note, supra note 64, at 626; Comment, supra note 60, at 874. These bur-
dens may result in changes in the schools' policies, indirectly encourage donations to
nondiscriminatory schools, and give a psychological boost to minority groups. See
Drake, supra note 69, at 505-06 (might shift donations to exempt organizations); id. at
506 ("psychological value" to minorities); Note, supra note 31, at 728 (Bob Jones may
change its policy since it has changed before). Unfortunately, the denial of exempt
status may serve to certify racist policies and provide publicity for segregated schools,
providing an unintended economic benefit.
135. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 1981 action allowed against private secular
schools).
136. Id. at 167.
137. Comment, Section 1981 Liability for Racially Discriminatory Sectarian
Schools, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1237, 1247 (1981) (interpreting Fourth Circuit's
decision in Bob Jones to mean that the government interest in eliminating race discrim-
ination outweights religious groups' interest in freedom from neutrally applied laws).
But see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 75, at 651 (potential § 1981
liability "is more serious than the tax exemption issue for it would end the existence of
these schools by government rule" and any prediction of the Court's decision "would be
speculative").
138. 103 S. Ct. at 2036-39 (Powell, J. concurring).
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Justice Powell should be commended for seeking to limit the use of the public
benefit standard, his reliance on the implicit ratification theory ignored the
central issue of whether the IRS exceeded its authority. If the IRS had the
power to make its interpretations, implicit ratification is not needed. If the
IRS exceeded its authority, it is difficult to see how a failure by Congress to
act can legitimatize such a usurpation of power. Both proponents and critics of
the implicit ratification theory stress the action or inaction of Congress in re-
gard to the correctness of the IRS interpretation."39 What is crucial, however,
is whether the IRS had the power to make the interpretation, regardless of
whether it was correct in some abstract sense.140
The effects of the Bob Jones decision will largely be determined by those
enforcing the rulings it upheld. The courts and the IRS may place the burden
of proof upon religious schools and other exempt organizations to show they do
not discriminate. 4 1 The burden of proving nondiscrimination could threaten
the first amendment rights of religious schools that do not discriminate,14 2
while creating difficulties for all section 501(c)(3) organizations subject to the
public benefit requirement.143
Despite all the possible implications of the Bob Jones decision, it is un-
likely that any of the "worst case" scenarios will occur. The IRS developed the
public benefit doctrine only after a great deal of prodding by the courts.144
Furthermore, the courts will probably continue to show substantial deference
toward freedom of religion" and may limit the precedential value of Bob
Jones to the particular fact situations considered.
139. See notes 97-105 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra (scope of IRS authority); cf.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946) (Com-
mission can be upheld even if there are reasonable alternatives or the court would have
have reached a different result); B. SCHWARZ, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 193-98 (1958) (agency decisions are reviewed for "reasonableness," not
"rightness").
141. Laycock, supra note 12, at 264-65.
142. There are already indications that courts may place the burden of proof on
the schools. See Judge Orders Affirmative Action as Condition for Tax Exemption,
TR.Axis, July-Aug. 1983, at 9 (citing Green v. Regan, Civ. Act. No. 1355-69 (D.D.C.
July 22, 1983)). Green held that tax exemptions would be denied to schools that "can-
not demonstrate that they do not racially discriminate." Id. (quoting opinion).
143. Laycock, supra note 12, at 264-65.
144. Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 23 n.25; see also notes 8-10 and accompa-
nying text supra.
145. Examples of the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold religious first
amendment claims in the face of otherwise valid laws are numerous. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (state cannot require compulsory attendance of
high school age children of Old Order Amish); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410
(1963) (state cannot deny unemployment compensation to a person whose unemploy-
ment results from a religiously-based refusal to work on Saturday); West Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (public school cannot require that Jeho-
vah's Witness children salute the flag).
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Still, a danger does exist that the federal government might, in a less
tolerant era, construe Bob Jones in such a way as to justify official repression
of certain religious groups or other organizations. 4 The Court could have is-
sued a narrow ruling, perhaps approving of the IRS rulings as within the
range of administrative discretion while disapproving of a broad public benefit
requirement.147 The Court can, and should, clarify and limit its decision to a
prohibition on racial discrimination. This will remove the undesirable implica-
tions of the public benefit requirement while continuing to affirm the federal
policy of eradicating discrimination. The best means of limiting the language
of Bob Jones would be to devise a standard for applying the public benefit test
in a manner that preserves the identity of charitable organizations while
preventing tax benefits from indirectly supporting private racial discrimina-
tion. 48 If such a standard cannot be found, Bob Jones should be limited to its
facts.
JOE W. MILLER
146. Nixon, supra note 113, at 21.
147. Cf. Dye & Webster, supra note 104, at 73 (broad language "is particularly
troubling because the Court's opinion did not need to be so broad to achieve its re-
sult"); Devins, Did the High Court Go Too Far to Make a Politically Popular Rul-
ing?, Nat'l L.J., June 20, 1983, at 13, col. 1 (ruling is "dangerously and needlessly
overbroad").
148. The following standards would limit the types of activities supporting revo-
cation of the exemption while preserving the identity of exempt organizations: (1)
Does the activity discriminate against what would be a suspect class if state action
were involved, e.g., race, national origin, or religion? This standard would provide a
guide for organizations seeking to limit their exposure, yet it would be flexible enough
to accomodate changing Court perceptions on the scope of strict scrutiny review. (2) Is
the discrimination necessary to preserve the identity of the exempt organization? Thus,
while a religious group may be free to exclude members of other religions from its
activities and retain its exemption, an organization that is primarily educational, liter-
ary, or scientific would not enjoy the same privilege. The sincerity of a religious group's
beliefs should not be questioned. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra. Orga-
nizations should be classified according to function, rather than purpose. Thus, a reli-
gious school would be treated as an educational institution, rather than a religious
group. Compare Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.29 (stressed educational function of
the University) with Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 897 (emphasized school's religious
purpose).
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